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Environmental Resource Permit governing the Wetlands Disposal System
("System").
Duda did not waive his right to challenge permit
modifications, but did waive the right to challenge the County's legal
interest in a non-exclusive easement. In addition, the County agreed to
take necessary steps to insure that Duda maintained his ability to use his
land. Such steps could include, but would not be limited to, reducing
pollution from the System and installing additional treatment facilities.
However, the County would only have to take steps to eliminate the
System's operations effects. If the County failed to take these necessary
steps, Duda would have a cause of action in eminent domain for the
resulting damages. Both parties agreed to these stipulations, which became
paragraph five of the supplemental order.
Both parties did not agree to the language in paragraph six. The trial
court adopted the language in Duda's proposal. The Florida Court of
Appeals found that in doing this, the trial court had exceeded its authority
in requiring the County to "take steps in the future to reduce or eliminate
contaminants to meet unascertained standards." The court also found the
County's proposal insufficient in that it failed to compensate Duda for the
current taking and limited compensation for possible future takings. In
addition, the County's proposal only addressed the issue of Duda's ability
to discharge phosphorus or nitrogen and did not address other pollutants.
Since deleting paragraph six was not an option, the appellate court vacated
the entire order and remanded for entry of a new one.
Rebekah King

Palm Coast Util. Corp. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comrn'n, 742 So. 2d 482
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Florida Public Service
Commission failed to provide evidentiary support for changes to certain
components of its rate-fixing methodology for utility).
Palm Coast Utility Company ("Palm Coast") provided water and
wastewater services to customers in Flagler County, Florida. The Florida
Public Service Commission ("Commission") granted Palm Coast a rate
increase amount that was significantly less then the rate increase the utility
requested. Florida case and statutory law entitled a regulated utility to earn
a fair rate of return on its rate base, that is, capital prudently invested in
the utility's facilities that are used and useful in the public service. Thus,
in determining Palm Coast's rate base, the Commission was required to
determine the portion which was "used and useful" for each component of
Palm Coast's water and wastewater system.
Palm Coast appealed the Commission's final order. Palm Coast argued
that the Commission erroneously determined components of the utility's
rate base and raised seven issues on appeal. The court first discussed Palm
Coast's three main arguments. Palm Coast argued that the Commission
erroneously calculated the used and useful portions of the utility's plant by:
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(1) changing to a "lot count" methodology; (2) eliminating a previously
included fire flow allowance for wells; and (3) changing to an annual
average daily flow measurement.
This court held that while the Commission was given great discretion
in rate-fixing, it still was required to comply with Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). The APA required the Commission to show
support for any change in rate-fixing policy through documentary evidence,
expert testimony, or other relevant evidence. Holding that the change to a
lot count methodology as a change to the rate-fixing policy lacked
substantiation, the court reversed and remanded the issue with directions to
the Commission to provide support for its decision to change to the lot
count methodology. The court also rejected Palm Coast's argument that
they lacked notice of the change to a lot count methodology. The court
stated that evidence of discussion of the proposed change in pre-hearing
documents demonstrated that Palm Coast had adequate notice.
The court similarly rejected the Commission's decision to eliminate the
fire flow allowance for wells. The court stated the change in the ratefixing policy lacked adequate evidentiary support. The court rejected the
Commission's justification that the fire flow allowance was not cost
effective from an engineering design perspective. Thus, the court reversed
and remanded the issue with directions to the Commission to provide
evidence to substantiate the decision to eliminate the fire flow allowance.
The court also rejected the Commission's justification for changing its
average flow measurement from a three-month average daily flow to an
annual average daily flow. The Commission argued that its decision was
justified because the Department of Environmental Protection recently
began using an annual measurement in issuing wastewater treatment plant
operation permits. The court held that the justification was insufficient to
uphold the decision to change the measurement technique. Thus, the court
reversed and remanded the issue with directions to the Commission to
provide evidence to substantiate the decision to change to an annual
average flow measurement.
In addition, the Commission's rate-fixing policy included a margin
reserve. The margin reserve enabled the utility to charge rates to its
current customers. This procedure was designed to provide extra money to
enable the utility to expand facilities to meet short-term growth demands
for future customers. Palm Coast argued that the Commission erroneously
permitted only an eighteen-month margin reserve period for water and
wastewater treatment plants and a twelve-month margin reserve period for
transmission lines. Although a departure from previous policy, the court
affirmed the Commission's time frames because substantial evidence,
including expert testimony, provided sufficient substantiation for the
change.
However, although the court accepted the Commission's
justifications for calculating margin reserve for treatmentplants and water
lines, the court held that the departure in time frame for the wastewater
treatment facility lacked substantiation. Thus, the court reversed and
remanded the issue for the Commission to provide adequate support.
Palm Coast also argued that the Commission erred in determining
imputed contributions-in-aid-of-construction by using proposed service, as
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opposed to actual availability charges. Palm Coast argued that actual
service availability charges were available to the Commission as of
November 1996 when the Commission approved the new charges of Palm
Coast. The court rejected the Commission's argument that it was not
required to use the actual service availability records because they were not
in the record of the case. The court held that the Commission was capable
of taking notice of its own orders.
The court affirmed the remaining issues without discussion.
Julie E. Hultgren

GEORGIA
Goode v. Mountain Lake Invs., L.L.C., No. S99A01710, 1999 WL
1048240 (Ga. Nov. 22, 1999) (holding the trial court had broad discretion
in fashioning an equitable remedy in a case to control the excess flow of
water running from one property to another).
The plaintiffs, David, Marjorie, and James Goode ("Goodes"), filed
suit against Mountain Lake Investments, L.L.C. ("MLI") claiming MLI
caused excessive surface water and sediment laden surface water to flow
onto the Goode's property. The Goodes' property lay at the bottom of a
forty-acre drainage basin, and MLI owned about fifteen acres of property
uphill from the Goodes. After acquiring its property, MLI added a road,
parking lot, and small manufacturing plant, and altered the property's
slope. The Goodes contended MLI's development diverted sediment laden
surface water onto their property causing a nuisance.
The trial court ordered MLI to reduce the flow of water from its
property to the Goodes' property to the level that existed prior to MLI's
development. MLI constructed a detention pond to correct the water flow
and sediment discharge problems. On the Goodes' request, the court
entered an order for permanent injunctive relief. The court noted that
siltation, caused by runoff from MLI's property, created the impetus for
the prior injunction, and the detention pond constructed by MLI alleviated
the problem. The court found that water flow from MLI's property to the
Goodes' property still exceeded the natural flow, but evidence showed this
problem existed prior to MLI's development. To remedy the situation, the
court found that the water flow needed to be controlled on the Goodes'
property with the construction of a ditch. Therefore, the court ordered
MLI to contribute fifty percent of the money needed to construct a ditch
across the Goodes' property.
The Goodes appealed the trial court's order. The Goodes first
contended the trial court abused its discretion in not requiring MLI to bring
Recent precedent,
the water flow back to pre-development levels.
however, held that a trial court's order to return surface water runoff to
pre-development levels constituted an "impossible and overreaching

